CIVIL PROCEDURE: POWER OF TRIAL JUDGE TO
GRANT NEW TRIAL-WHERE VERDICT IS AGAINST
WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE
of Lind v. Schenley Industries, Inc.,' is a significant
development in the law governing the trial judge's power to grant a new
trial when he believes that the verdict is against the weight of the
evidence.2 Plaintiff, an employee of defendant's corporate predecessor,3
sued to recover money allegedly due under an incentive compensation
plan.4 After the jury returned a special verdict for the plaintiff, the
federal district judge granted the defendant's motions for judgment
n.o.v., and, in the alternative, for a new trial if the judgment n.o.v.
were reversed on appeal." The alternative motion for new trial was
granted because the trial judge found the verdict "(i) contrary to
the weight of the evidence, (2) contrary to law and (3) a result of error
in the admission of evidence."' The Court of Appeals for the Third
THE

RECENT CASE

1278 F.2d 79 ( 3 d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 835 (196o).
'A federal district judge may grant a new trial under Rule 59 of the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure.

"Rule 59(a) Grounds.

A new trial may be granted to all or any

of the parties and on all or part of the issues (i) in an action in which there has
been a trial by jury, for any of the reasons for which new trials have heretofore been
granted in actions at law in the courts of the United States. .. "
'The plaintiff had originally sued Park & Tilford Distiller's Corporation, which
later merged with Schenley Industries, Inc., the latter assuming all of the former's
obligations. Schenley Industries was substituted as defendant in the Lind case by order
of the trial judge.
' Plaintiff was assistant to the metropolitan New York sales manager of Park &
"Tilford and was later New York district manager for the corporation. Lind alleged
that he had been informed of the plan by his supervisor who had authority, actual or
apparent, to bind the corporation. The defendant introduced conflicting evidence however. Lind had been receiving a salary of $125-175 per week. The alleged compensation plan would have given Lind i% of the gross sales of salesmen under his
supervision. The jury found that the plan was in effect for ten months, and the trial
judge awarded Lind damages of $36,953.50.

' FED. R. Civ. P. 5 9 (b). "Within io days after the reception of a verdict, a party
who has moved for a directed verdict may move to have the verdict and any judgment
entered thereon set aside and to have judgment entered in accordance with his motion
for a directed verdict. . . . A motion for a new trial may be joined with this motion,
or a new trial may be prayed for in the alternative." The trial judge is to rule simultaneously upon the motions for judgment n.o.v. and new trial if both are sought.
Montgomery Ward v. Duncan, 311 U.S. 243 (1940).
*Lind v. Schenley Industries, Inc., x67 F. Supp. 59 o , 596 (D.N.J. 1958).
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Circuit reversed both the judgment n.o.v. and the alternative order
granting a new trial,7 and reinstated the jury verdict." After rejecting
the last two grounds for the granting of the new trial, the court held
that the trial judge had abused his discretion in granting a new trial on
the first ground assigned. Two judges, dissented, pointing out that the
Third Circuit had "never before reversed an order, of a trial judge
granting a new trial because of his conclusion on all of the evidence
that the jury had reached an unjust result."' This departure from
prior decisions warrants a close investigation of appellate regulation of
the trial judge's power to grant a new trial when he believes that the
verdict is against the weight of the evidence.
The right of a trial judge to grant a new trial on this ground was
not recogxiized at early common law, when juries were deemed to
decide cases of their own knowledge.Y Rather, writ of attaint was used
In reversing the judgment n.o.v., the court concluded that the jury verdict was not
contrary to the New York agency and contract law applicable in the action. This
ruling automatically excluded the trial court's second ground for the granting of the
new trial. The court also concluded that .certain business records were properly
introduced into evidence, thus eliminating the third ground for the granting of the new
trial.
s The decision in.the Lidn :case- may -also be questioned on an issue beyond consideration in this note. Because of the final judgment rule" (28 U.S.C. §.1.91 (I958)),,a
serious question arises as to the propriety, once a judgment n.o.v. is reversed by a
Court of Appeals, of considering at that time, before remand for the new trial and a
later final judgment, the appellant's challenge of the new, trial order. In Montgomery Ward v. Duncan, 31x U.S. 24.3, 254 (1940) the Supreme Court stated:
.
"Should the trial judge enter judgment n.o.v. and in the alternative, grant a new trial
on any of the grounds assigned therefor, his disposition of the motion for a new trial
would not ordinarily be reviewable, and only'his action in entering judgment:wobrld
be ground of appeal. If the judgment were reversed, the case, on remand, would be
governed by the trial judge's award of a new trial."
The Court cited in this connection Fairmount Glass Works v. Cub Fork Coal Co., 287
U.S. 474 (1933), which recognized review of decisions on new trial motions'f6r
errors of law but not for rulings within thd discretion of the trial court. In later
decisions, most ourts of appeals have felt themselves prevented from passing upon the
correctness of a new trial order granted on the ground in question after reveriing 'a
judgmentn.o.v. Menneti v. Evans Constr. Co., 59"F.'2 367 ( 3 d Cir. 1958) 5 Binder ir.
Commercial Travelers Mut. Ace. Ass'n of America, 16 F.±d 896 (2d Cir. 1948), discussed with approval in 5 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE, 50.13, at 2346 (2d ed. 195i).
Contra, Moist Cold Refrigerator Co. v.. Lou Johnson Co., 749 F.7d 246 ( 9 th Cir.)
"(dicttfm), cert. denied, 356 U.8. 968 ( 58), approved in '3' BARRON & HoL'ZoFF,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § i3oz.r, at 347 (reV. ed. 1958).
'Lind v. Schenley Industries, Inc., 278 F.zd 79, 9, ( 3 d Cir. 196o).
10 Slade's"Case, Style 13 9 8"2 Eng.'Rep. 592 (K.B. 1648). See 6 MooRE, FEDERAL
PRACTICE, 59.o5[i] (2d ed. i95i) for a general history of the development of the
granting of new trials.
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to secure reconsideration of the correctness of the jury verdict." This
procedure fell into disuse, however, and new trials came to be granted
by courts in banc.'2 The practice was firmly established in 1757, when
1
Lord Mansfield commented:
Trial by jury, in civil causes, could not subsist now without a power, somewhere, to grant new trials .... But a general verdict can only be set right by

a new trial; which is no more than having the same cause more deliberately
considered by another jury; when there is a reasonable doubt or perhaps a
certainty, that justice has not been done.
American appellate courts early recognized the power of the trial
judge to grant new trials, not only for errors of law, but also on such
discretionary grounds as the verdict's being against the weight of the
evidence. 1 4 When reviewing these discretionary rulings, appellate
courts consistently state that they will reverse only for "abuse of discretion."1 5 They have experienced difficulty, however, in formulating
criteria to indicate just when a trial judge abuses his discretion by granting a new trial because he believes the verdict is against the weight of
the evidence. Until the early twentieth century, it was generally stated
that a new trial should be granted on this ground only if the verdict
was "manifestly and palpably"" or "decidedly and strongly"' 7 or
"'If the second jury found the verdict to be incorrect, the original jurors were

"imprisoned for a year, forfeited their goods, became infamous, their wives and children
were turned out, and their lands laid waste." i HOimswORTH, HISTORY oF ENGLISH
LAW 341 (7 th ed. rev. 1956).
"'Writ of attaint was used primarily to discourage perjury by jurors during the
time when the jurors served as witnesses. As this jury function ceased, the writ lost its
original purpose. Public opinion turned against the harsh penalties imposed upon the
original jurors and the writ of attaint was little used in the sixteenth century. Its
demise was confirmed by Bushell's Case, Vaugh. 135, 1z4 Eng. Rep. ioo6 (C.P.
1670).
3

" Bright v. Enyon, i Burr. 390, 393, 97 Eng. Rep. 365, 366 (K.B. -757).
"Kohne v. Insurance Co. of No. America, 14 Fed. Cas. 838 (No. 7921) (C.C.D.
Pa. 1804) ; Curtis v. Jackson, 13 Mass. (x2 Tyng) 507 (x8x6). In America it was
necessary for the trial judge to exercise the power to grant new trials, since the practice
of having the trial judge also sit on a court in banc was not adopted from the English
practice. Hinton, Power of Federal Appellate Court to Review Rulings on Motion
for New Trial, i U. Cm. L. RFV. 1x1 (1933).
"Williams v. Nichols, 266 F.zd 389 ( 4 th Cir. 1959); De Pascale v. Pennsylvania
R.R., x8o F.zd 825 (3 d Cir. i95o) i Guy Frye & Sons, Inc., v. Francis, 242 N.C. 107,

86 S.E.2d 790 (1955).
8
" Scott v. Blumb, 7 Ill.
(z Gilm.) 595 (1845)
130 Mich. 460, 90 N.W. 287 (1902).
.. "Finney v. Sanford, 4-1 Ga. 295 (x870).

;

Whipple v. Michigan Cent. R.R.,
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statements have fallen into disuse, however, perhaps because they fail
to provide articulate and functional guides for the trial judge:
More recent formulations attempt no more than to indicate the perspective in which the trial judge should consider motions for new trial.

Appellate courts have admonished trial judges to use "mature judicial
discretion," 2 "exercised with regard to what is right and in the interests
of justice. ' 22 The motion for new trial tests "the overall justice of the
case result."2
The Lint decision far exceeds prior appellate efforts to delineate
and restrict the area within which the trial judge may properly grant a
new trial on the ground that the verdict is against the weight of the
evidence. The Third Circuit first distinguishes new trials granted on
this ground from "new trials ordered for other reasons: for example,
evidence improperly admitted, prejudicial statements by counsel, an
improper charge to the jury or newly discovered evidence." 2' 4 These
latter grounds are denominated "undesirable or pernicious elements.""
"0 Marshall's Adm'x v. Valley R.R., 97 Va. 653, 34 S.E. 455 (1899)" Jameson v. Weld, 93 Me. 345, 45 Ad. 299 (.899) 5 Garrett v. Driver-Harris
Wire Co., 7o N.J.L. 382, 57 Ad. 127 (1904).
" This language is found only occasionally in modern opinions. Moist Cold Refrigerator Co. v. Lou Johnson Co., 249 F.zd 246, 256 ( 9 th Cir.), cert. denied, 356
U.S. x68 (.958) Gregory v. James, 153 Me. 453, 457, 14o A.zd 725, 728 (-958);
Mulroy v. Co-operative Transit Co., 142 W.Va. x65, 1i1, 95 S.E.zd 63, 72 (1956).
"2 Miller v. Tennessee Gas. Transmission Co., 220 F.2d 4-34 (sth Cir. 1955).
Similarly, it is said that the trial judge should use sound discretion. Morris Bros.
Lumber Co. v. Eakin, 262 F.2d 259 ( 3 d Cir. 1959) 5 Norfolk So. Ry. v. Davis Frozen
Foods, Inc., 195 F.2d 662 ( 4 th Cir. 1952)5 Caudle v. Swanson, 248 N.C. 249, 103
S.E.2d 357 (1958).
Other cases
"Commercial Credit Corp. v. Pepper, 187 F.2d 71 (5th Cir. x95x).
have said that the trial judge should exercise his discretion in order to "prevent a miscarriage of justice." Whiteman v. Pitrie, 22o F.zd 914 (Sth Cir. i955) 5 Garrison v.
United States, 62 F.zd 4x ( 4 th Cir. 1932).
z
"Wilson v. Bailey, 257 F.2d 35 (oth Cir. 1958).
"The court distinguishes the two categories on the following basis:
"In the first instance given it is the jury itself which fails properly to perform the functions confided to it by law. In the latter instances something occurred in the course of
the trial which resulted or which may have resulted in the jury receiving a distorted,
incorrect, or an incomplete view of the operative facts, or some undesirable element
obtruded itself into the proceedings creating a condition whereby the giving of a just
verdict was rendered difficult or impossible. In the latter instances . . . the trial court
delivered the jury from a possibly erroneous verdict arising from circumstances over
which the jury had no control. Under these circumstances there is no usurpation by
the court of the prime function of the jury as the trier of the facts." Lind v. Schenley
Industries, Inc., 278 F.2d 79, 90 ( 3 d Cir. 196o).
2"5 id.
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The court believes that it must exercise closer supervision over the granting of new trials where no such element is found in order to prevent
usurpation by the trial judge of "the prime function of the jury as the
trier of the facts."' 26 The court further distinguishes between litigation
that is "qong and complicated and deals with a subject matter not lying
within the ordinary knowledge of jurors127 and litigation that is
"familiar and simple, the evidence relating to ordinary commercial
practices, ' 28 stating that the trial judge is permitted to scrutinize the
verdict more closely in the former case than in the latter. The Lind
case is deemed to fall within the latter category.
Analysis of the court's opinion reveals three rules to guide the trial
judge in the granting of new trials: (i) the trial judge may grant new
trials because of the presence of "undesirable or pernicious elements" in
either complex or "familiar and simple" litigation, (2) in complex
litigation the trial judge has wide discretion in granting new trials on
the ground that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence and
(3) the trial judge is restricted, and will be closely supervised by the
appellate court, in granting new trials in "familiar and simple" litigation on the ground that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence.
Though the court employs new labels, the results that would be obtained
under the first two rules generally accord with well-established principles. The last rule, however, is a restrictive departure from prior
decisions.
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals purported to seek "ascertainable
legal standards," 2 applicable when the trial judge's order granting
a new trial is being reviewed for abuse of discretion. Two difficulties
arise, however, which seriously limit the efficacy of the Lind formula
as an objective "rule of thumb."
In what cases will the fact situation presented be "familiar and
simple?" Appellate courts have long recognized that the trial judge
is in the best position to ascertain the true nature of the case and the
strength and complexity of the evidence presented. 0 For this reason,
some appellate courts utilize a presumption that the trail judge's
28

Ibid.
Ibid. The court gives as an example of this type of litigation "a case requiring
a -jury to pass upon the nature of an alleged newly discovered organic compound in an
infringement action." Id. at 91.
2
20 Id. at 88.
B Ibid.
- The United States Supreme Court has observed that "determination of whether
a new trial should be granted or a judgment entered under Rule So (b) calls for the
judgment in the first instance of the judge who saw and hcard the witnesses and has
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opinion of the weight of the evidence is accurate. 3' Similarly, other
courts will reverse the granting of a new trial only upon a showing of
"dear" or "palpable". abuse of discretion. 2 It is significant in this
respect that the Lind case cites no federal appellate decision reversing
the granting of a new trial after a verdict contrary to the trial judge's
opinion of the weight of the evidence. 3
Moreover, when has an "undesirable or pernicious element" entered
into a trial? In actual practice, a number of such elements may be
present in a trial. These elements include the obvious ones acknowledged by the court. However, other such elements, more subtle in
nature, as, for example, the demeanor of witnesses, suspicions of bias of
the jury, or innuendo of questions may, when taken in combination, improperly affect a litigant's status before the jury. Any one of these
might not be deemed serious enough to warrant granting a new trial
on that ground alone. Under the Lind rule, however, such an element
would not fall into the court's "undesirable or pernicious" category unless it alone is prejudicial enough to justify the granting of a new trial.
Hence, the trial judge would seem to be precluded from considering
such combined elements in deciding on motions for a new trial in
"familiar and simple litigation." Yet, these are factors which the trial
judge traditionally has been permitted to evaluate independently of
the jury's verdict in determining if the verdict is against the weight
of the evidence 4
It would seem that the broad language of the Lind case was not
the feel of the case which no appellate printed transcript can impart." Cone v. West
Virginia Pulp & Paper Co., 33o U.S. 212, z6 (1947). This spirit is also seen
in Mihalchak v. American Dredging Co., 266 F.2d 875 ( 3 d Cir.), cert. denied, 36i
U.S. 901 (t959); Cloud v. Fallis, xo So. 2d 669 (Fla. 1959); Bresnahan v. Proman,
312 Mass. 97, 43 N.E.2d 336 (1942); Discargar v. City of Seattle, 30 Wash.zd 461,
191 P.2d 870 (1948).
"Ballard v. Pacific Greyhound Lines, z8 Cal. 7d 357, 170 P.2d 465 (-946)j
Martin v. Stone, 5i So. 2d 33 (Fla. 195). It would seem that North Carolina has a
conclusive presumption to this effect, for its courts will'not review the granting of a
new trial on the ground in question. Roberts v. Hill, 24o N.C. 373, 82 S.E.2d 373
(1954).
32Bugdoian v. Union Trust Co., 337 11. App. 4o5, 86 N.E.2d 253 (949);
Schroeder v. Texas Co., 169 Kan. 607, 219 P.2d io63 (195o) ; Hartpence v. Grouleff,
15 N.J. 545, 5 A.2d 514 (s54); Tupponce v. Pennsylvania R.R., 358 Pa. 589, 57

A.2d 898 (.948).
"The dissenting opinion in the Lind case stated that there'was no such case in the
Third 'Circuit. 278 F.2d at+ 91. Independent'research has not discovered any federal
decision so holding.
"See cases cited at note 37 infra.
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necessary to the decision. The court's narrow objection to the trial
judge's order granting a new trial was its belief that the trial judge had
substituted his opinion of the credibility of the witnesses for that of the
jury. Hence, the court held that the trial judge had abused his discretion. 5 Some federal district judges have felt themselves restricted
in this respect, 6 but the majority of appellate courts allow the trial
juxdge to consider the credibility of witnesses in passing on motions for
new trial on the ground in question. a7 Indeed, the Third Circuit has
followed this line of authority in recent decisions. 8
It is submitted that to deny the trial judge the right to consider the
credibility of witnesses in passing on motions for new trial is to confuse
the-standard'to be applied by him when considering motions for directed
verdict or judgment n.o.v. with the standard associated with motions for
new trial. In passing upon motions in the former category, the trial
judge must view all the evidence in the -lightmost favorable to the nonmovant, resolving conflicts in"
the evidence and drawing all legitimate
inferences in- favor of that party." The trial- judge's appraisal of the
credibility of witnesses is of no consequence, for all doubts as to credibility must be resolved in favor of the non-movant. In contrast, the
great majority of state and federal courts take the position that the
trial judge may rely upon his own opinion of the weight of the evidence
• "IfLind's testimony and that of Mrs. Kennan, Kaufmann's secretary, was deemed
credible, Lind presented a convincing, indeed an overwhelming case. We must conclude
that the jury did believe this testimony and that the court below substituted its judgment
for that of the jury on this issue and thereby abused its legal discretion." Lind v.
Schenley Industries, Inc., 278 F.zd 79, 91 ( 3 d Cir. 196o).
38 Shirra v. Delaware, L. & W. R.R., 103 F. Supp. 8xz (M.D. Pa. 1952); Moore
v. Rosecliff Realty Corp., 88 F. Supp. 956 (D.NJ. 395o ) ; American Cooler Co. v.
Fay & Scott, 2o F. Supp. 782 (N.D. Me. 1937)5 Pringle v. Guild, x9 Fed. 962

(C.C.S.C, 1903).
37 Altrichter v. Shell Oil Co., 263 F.2d 377 (8th Cir. 1959); Marsh v. Illinois Cent.
R.R., 175 F.zd, 498 (5th Cir. 1949)5 Ballard v. Pacific Greyhound Lines, z8 Cal. zd
357, .z1o0P.2d 465 (1946); Cloud v. Fallis, i3o So. 2d 669 (Fla. 1959); Thompson
v. Titus, 169 Ohio St. 203, 158 N.E.2d 357 (z959) (per curiam); Wein v. Lucey,
8x RI. 4.34, 1o4 A.2d 248 (.954).
38 Zegan v. Central R.R., 266 F.2d 1o
(3 d Cir. 1959); Morris Bros. Lumber Co.
v. Eakin, 262 F.zd 259 (3 d Cir. 1959); Magee v. General Motors Corp., 213 F.2d
899- (3 d Cir. 1954). "The... [motion for a new trial] requires that the trial
judge
evaluate all significant evidence, deciding in the exercise of his own best judgment

whether the jury has so disregarded the clear weight of the credible evidence that a new
trial, is necessary to prevent injustice." Zegan v. Central R.R,, supra at 104.
1' Hanson v. Ford Motor Co;, 278 F.zd. 586 (8th Cir. x96o) 5 Snead v. New York
Cent. R.R., 216 F.zd x69 (4 th Cir. 1954); Downey v. Union Paving Co., 184 F.zd
481 (3 d Cir. 1949).
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when considering a motion for new trial and is not bound by the
jury's opinion, as reflected in its verdict.4 °
It must be recognized and accepted that the proper extent of the
trial judge's control over the jury verdict cannot be reduced to abstract
"rules of thumb."' The trial judge can achieve substantial justice in
the particular case only if he is allowed to exercise broad discretion,
guided by his judicial training and experience and intimate knowledge
of the litigation at hand. Unlike the directed verdict or judgment
n.o.v., the granting of a new trial is not a final decision on the merits of
a cause of action. Rather, the power and duty to grant a new trial
is vested in the trial judge so that he may require reconsideration by
another jury when, after giving due deference to the jury verdict, he
concludes that the verdict is erroneous. Thus, the granting of new
trials on the ground that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence
is an "expedient middle ground"4 u between the uncontrolled jury and
complete judicial usurpation of the jury function.
Broadly stated, the Lind decision would require that an appellate
court closely scrutinize the granting of new trials in "familiar and simple
litigation" where the trial judge could not point to what the appellate
court, reading a record of the proceedings below, would categorize as an
"undesirable or pernicious element." - In practical effect, the trial judge
often could choose only between the limited alternatives of permitting
the jury verdict to stand or of granting -a judgment n.o.v. Narrowly
stated, the Lind decision would prevent the trial judge from considering
the credibility of witnesses in deciding on motions for new trial on
the ground that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. To
the extent that this decision, under either of the above interpretations,
restricts the expedient middle ground of the new trial, it does not merit
adoption by other appellate courts.
"°Altrichter v. Shell Oil Co., z63 F.2d 377 (8th Cir. 1959); Moist Cold Refrigerator Co. v. Lou Johnson Co., 249 F.2d 246 ( 9 th Cir.), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 968
(1958); Snead v. New York Cent. R.R., -216 F.2d 569 (4th Cir. 1954); Marsh v.
Illinois Cent. R.R., 175 F.2d 498 (sth Cir. -1949) Felton v. Spiro, 78 Fed. 576
(6th Cir. 1897) ; Heedman v. Kelsey, 414 Ill. 453, iii N.E.2d 538 (1953); Roberts v.
Hill, 240 N.C. 373, 82 S.E.zd 373 (195+) ; 3 BARRON & HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 5302 ) 'at 339 (Tev. ed. 5958).
" Professor Moore'has stated that: "No rigid or fixed formula can or should prescribe how this principle is to be universally applied. The trial court, which has a feel
for the case, should apply the principle so that substantial justice is done on the facts
of the individual case." 6 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACrICE 59.05151, at 3756 (2d ed.
1951).
' 2 Lind v. Schenley Industries;-Inc., 278 F;zd 79, 91 ( 3 d Cir. 596o).

